Note: *The figure for LTSB is believed to be understated by 10/15% but the bank was unwilling to provide reconcilable data
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**Network figure for LTSB, England & Wales contains at least 200 overlapping ex Lloyds and ex TSB branches in urban areas that have yet to be merged.

The similarity in size of networks (after adjustment of LTSB) in England & Wales is striking as is the comparability of their individual share of the sole (and dual) bank situations.

However, in assessing the vulnerability to closure in the communities concerned it is relevant to compare network size to the respective market shares of ‘current account business’ amongst small businesses, the heaviest and most persistent users of branch counters:

Based on data in the Competition Commission’s SME Banking Inquiry Report of 2001. The Scottish scene is less directly comparable for historic reasons.

These figures would indicate an unsustainable higher delivery cost for HSBC which in 2002 recommenced branch closures, not excluding sole bank sites, after a very long interval. Sole and dual bank communities relying on HSBC representation must have a higher level of vulnerability to future cost reduction exercises which in HSBC’s case could be triggered by events elsewhere in the world as it is by far the most global of retail banks operating in the UK. In Wales HSBC has 60% of the rural sole bank sites, more than the other 3 banks put together.

Royal Bank situations in England are concentrated in the North West homeland of the acquired and absorbed former Williams Deacons Bank.

The current size of the networks is not sacrosanct and it is relevant that new entrants to the SME market, Halifax and Abbey National were quoted in the recent report on branch access for the Office of Fair Trading as being satisfied that their existing networks of c 800 each were sufficient to reach their target market objectives which do not include branch dependent customers with cash and cheque volumes.

Servicing so called marginal communities cost-effectively is clearly a problem only for the Big 4 in England & Wales and the Big 3 in Scotland and yet they are, inexplicably, reluctant to engage in serious consideration and trials of the shared banking options which would reduce and share costs whilst maximizing footfall. In particular they have to date resisted the concept of a “brand neutral” outsourced vehicle to provide counter services in such locations, advocated by independent consultants and academics and validated by Loughborough University Banking Centre as operationally feasible and financially viable.